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1. INTRODUCTION
Sponsored search becomes an easy platform to match po-
tential consumers’ intent with merchants’ advertising. Ad-
vertisers express their willingness to pay for each keyword
in terms of bids to the search engine. When a user’s query
matches the keyword, the search engine evaluates the bids
and allocates slots to the advertisers that are displayed along
side the unpaid algorithmic search results. The advertiser
only pays the search engine when its ad is clicked by the
user and the price-per-click is determined by the bids of
other competing advertisers.
It seems natural to assume that the number of clicks an ad
will get when displayed depends on some ad-specific factors.
For example, when a potential buyer searches the key word
“tennis racquet”, an ad with “The Lowest Prices Guaran-
teed!” seems to be more intriguing and more likely to result
in a click than an ad with “Save on Tennis Racquets”. Be-
sides, an online tennis store that has built a high reputa-
tion among the internet shoppers is more likely to attract
more clicks than an online tennis store that keeps leaving
customers negative experiences. There are many other mea-
sures of “ad quality” search engines may also consider in
deciding which ads to display and at which positions.
These measures are incorporated into an “ad quality” scor-
ing system that is widely used by the major search engines.
For example, Google ranks ads by bid times the correspond-
ing ad-quality score. When the ad-quality score of each ad-
vertiser is interpreted as the expected number of clicks the
corresponding ad can generate once it is displayed, then the
ads are ranked in the order of their expected revenue. This
interpretation of the ad-quality score conveys a message to
the advertisers: the search engine wants the higher ranked
slots, those more likely to receives clicks, to go to the ads
expected to generate higher revenues for it. It is not strange
that all search engines’ goal in selling the ad slots is revenue
maximization, but how do they achieve the goal through
the ad-quality scoring remains a secrete to the advertisers.
A simple example can show that, though intuitively appeal-
ing, ranking ordered by bid times expected click-through
rate might not be the optimal ranking to generate maximum
revenue for the search engine. Then two problems become
interesting: What is a good scoring strategy for the search
engine to maximize its revenue? Does the interpretation
of the ad-quality score truly represents what the ad-quality
score does in the process of revenue maximization?
In this paper, we study the scoring strategy of the search
engine for the purpose of revenue maximization. Section 2
gives the preliminaries needed for our analysis. After speci-
fying the ad auction model rules, notations and the related
literature, we show some ad scoring examples that motivated
this work. In Section 3, we focus on the complete information
setting, where advertisers’ values are known. Our analysis
shows that when there are more advertisers than slots, there
is a scoring strategy that induces a Nash equilibrium formed
by the set of truthful bids. Under such an equilibrium, the
search engine takes all the social surplus and the socially
optimal ranking of the advertisers is the optimal ranking for
maximizing the search engine’s revenue. Furthermore, we
show that under such a truthful bidding Nash equilibrium,
when the click-through rate for an advertiser at a certain slot
takes a product form of an ad-specific factor and a position-
specific factor, there exists a 0
(
N2
)
time algorithm to find
the socially optimal ranking of the advertisers which also
maximize the search engine’s revenue.
In Section 4, we move to the incomplete information case
where advertisers’ values are not known by the search en-
gine. Based on some rational advertisers behavior argu-
ments, we propose an adaptive online algorithm that dy-
namically scores ads to reveal advertisers’ values and to ma-
nipulate their rankings to maximize the search engine’s total
revenue. In Section 5, we test the algorithm under the 8-slot
sponsored ads setting used by Google, Microsoft (Bing.com)
and Yahoo! and simulation results show that the perfor-
mance of the algorithm agrees very well with our theoretical
analysis. We conclude the paper in Section 6.
2. PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Auction rules
We focus on a single keyword slot auction, where there are N
advertisers competing for S slots. Without loss of generality,
we assume S ≥ N , since redundant slots can remain blank.
Let i = 1, ..., N index advertisers and j = 1, ..., S index slots.
Let vi, bi be the value, bid of advertiser i for a particular
keyword and pi,j be the price per click advertiser i pays
at slot j. Let ei > 0 be the ad-quality score the search
engine assigns to advertiser i to represent a measure of the
predicted click-through rate advertiser i will generate and
xi,j be the actual click-through rate advertiser i receives at
slot j per hour.
We follow the rules of the auction described in [1] by Varian
that are used by the major search engines.
(1) Each advertiser i chooses a bid bi.
(2) The advertisers are ordered by bid times predicted click-
through rate bi × ei.
(3) The price that advertiser i pays for a click is the mini-
mum necessary to retain its position.
(4) If there are fewer bidders than slots, the last bidder pays
a reserve price pr.
2.2 Previous literature
When ei ≡ 1 for all the advertisers, the above described auc-
tion becomes the Generalized Second Price Auction (GSP)
first developed and adopted by Google in 2002, where adver-
tisers are ranked by their bids and the advertiser assigned
slot j pays the price per click equal to the bid of the ad-
vertiser assigned slot j + 1. Early studies on some basic
properties of GSP are independently reported by Edelman
et al. [2] and Varian [3].
In their analysis, the ad auction problem is modeled as a
game where each advertiser is a player who uses bidding
as strategy to maximize its surplus, i.e., the value of the
clicks it receives minus the price it pays the search engine
for those clicks. The game becomes of special interest when
in equilibrium, each advertiser prefer its current slot to other
slots and has no incentive to change how it is bidding. Here
is the formal definition.
Definition 1. Given the advertisers’ value (v1, ..., vN ), a
Nash equilibrium is the set of bids so that given these bids,
no advertiser has an incentive to change its bid. Specifically,
a Nash Equilibrium (NE) satisfies, for any advertiser i,
(vi − pi,j)xi,j ≥ (vi − pi,j′)xi,j′ for all slots j
′ 6= j.
Varian in [3] studies the bidding behavior under the GSP
auction and shows every advertiser has a range for the bid
to place to maintain its current position. He derives many
meaningful results when the advertisers’ bidding profile and
the corresponding pay per click prices reach a subset of
Nash Equilibrium, namely the symmetric Nash equilibrium
(SNE). Based on the lower and upper bounds of the SNE
bids, Varian derives the lower and upper bounds of the total
revenue a search engine can obtain [3] and further estimates
advertisers’ surpluses based on the prices per click they pay
[1].
Lahaie [4] gives a good study on the two auctions, one with
all ei being equal and the other with ei representing the ex-
pected click-through rate and names them“rank by bid”and
“rank by revenue” respectively. Both complete and incom-
plete settings are considered and estimation of the search
engine’s revenue is given. However, there is no analysis of
revenue-maximizing scoring strategy for the searching en-
gine.
The most relevant work to ours can be found in Liu and
Chen [?] where the “ad-quality” score is referred to as the
“weighting factor”. They study in the incomplete informa-
tion setting both the “efficient” weighting factor that max-
imize the total social surplus and the “optimal” weighting
factor that maximize the search engine’s revenue. However,
they only focus on the ad auction model with one slot and
the quality type for the advertisers is binary (high or low),
while we study multiple advertisers and slots and obtain the
corresponding results through equilibrium analysis in the
complete information setting.
2.3 Motivating Examples
In [3] Varian gives the lower and upper bounds of the total
revenue a search engine can obtain by selling the ad positions
but does not discuss whether this revenue under the sym-
metric Nash equilibrium is optimal. Here, a simple example
shows that when the ad-quality score ei accurately predicts
the click-through rate for each advertiser i, the resulting
ranking based on bi × ei might not generate the maximum
revenue for the search engine.
Table 1 gives the different click-through rates three adver-
tisers Coke, Pepsi and Dr. Pepper will get under different
rankings for the key word “soda drink” in a 3-slot ad auc-
tion. Let us assume that Coke and Pepsi are the only two
advertisers that sell cola and potential buyers looking for
cola will either click on Coke or Pepsi. Further assume Coke
has a bigger brand name and whenever placed at the same
position will always receive a higher click-through rate than
Pepsi (xCoke,j > xPepsi,j).
Tables 2-4 give the advertisers’ bids, surpluses and the search
engine’s revenue generated under 3 different scoring and
ranking scenarios. Drink X is always the one that does not
get a slot.
In scenario 1, Coke, Pepsi and Dr. Pepper are enjoying
surpluses of $4.9, $1.0 and $0.60 per hour respectively and
generating $2.1, $2.0 and $1.4 per hour for the search engine.
In such a setting, Dr. Pepper does not have an incentive to
move up in the ranking or otherwise it needs to pay at least
$0.105 per click which is greater than its value of $0.10 per
click. Dr. Pepper does not have an incentive to move down
either since that will make its surplus 0. Coke and Pepsi
would also prefer their current positions. To see this, if Coke
moves down one slot, it needs to pay at least $0.0286 and
receives 50 clicks per hour. This ends up with a surplus of
$3.5714, which is less than the $4.9 surplus it is making now.
Similarly, if Pepsi moves down one slot, its surplus becomes
$0.8 and if Pepsi moves up on slot, its surplus is -$0.8333,
both are less than its current surplus $1.0. Finally, Drink
X does not want to move up one slot because it has to pay
$0.10 which will make its current 0 surplus being negative.
Table 1: Click-through rates under different rankings for Coke, Pepsi and Dr. Pepper.
Advertiser Rank xi,j Rank xi,j Rank xi,j Rank xi,j Rank xi,j Rank xi,j
Coke 1 70 1 80 2 50 2 70 3 40 3 50
Pepsi 2 30 3 20 1 50 3 30 1 60 2 50
Dr. Pepper 3 20 2 30 3 20 1 35 2 30 1 35
Table 2: Bids and quality scores for the key word “soda drink”, senario 1.
Advertiser ei bi ei × bi Rank pi,j vi xi,j (vi − pi,j)× xi,j pi,j × xi,j
Coke 70 $0.05 3.5 1 $0.03 $0.10 70 $4.9 $2.1
Pepsi 30 $0.07 2.1 2 $0.067 $0.10 30 $1.0 $2.0
Dr. Pepper 20 $0.10 2.0 3 $0.07 $0.10 20 $0.60 $1.4
Drink X 20 $0.07 1.4 4 $0 $0.07 0 $0 $0
Therefore, scenario 1 is an NE. Further more, the quality
scores for Coke, Pepsi and Dr. Pepper perfectly predict
the actual click-through rates after the ranking and reflect
the fact that Coke has a relatively higher “ad quality” than
Pepsi. However, this“full mark”scoring generates the lowest
revenue among the 3 scenarios.
In scenario 2, quality scores for Coke and Pepsi are changed
to be the same of 50 with the remaining advertisers’ scores
unchanged. This change results in the swap of ranking for
Coke and Pepsi compared with scenario 1. It is easy to check
scenario 2 also represents an NE in advertisers bidding and
that bidding profile is exactly the same as in scenario 1,
but with $0.4 more revenue generated for the search engine.
Here, quality scores also perfectly predict the actual click-
through rates but do not show the fact that Coke has a
better “ad quality” than Pepsi.
Tables 2-3 together show that if the purpose of scoring is
to accurately predict the click-through rates and thus the
expected revenue from each advertiser, scores do not neces-
sarily need to reflect the true relative “ad qualities”.
Scenario 3 generates the highest revenue for the search en-
gine among the 3 scoring profiles and forms another NE with
an increased bid of Pepsi from $0.07 to $0.08. This increase
in bid is a result of the decreased ad-quality score for Pepsi
compared with scenario 2. It is interesting to note that in-
creasing the bid from $0.07 to $0.08 does not increase Pepsi’s
pay per click rate but eliminates Coke’s incentive of moving
up one slot. In this scenario, the scores reflect the relative
“ad qualities” for Coke and Pepsi but do not agree with the
actual click-through rates.
The above described simple example shows many interesting
observations about ad-quality scoring and ranking.
1. Rankings can be changed by manipulating the ad-quality
scores ei for corresponding advertisers to serve the purpose
of increasing the search engine’s revenue. This can be done
with (i.e., scenario 3) or without (i.e., scenario 2) changing
the bidding profile of the advertisers.
2. The scoring profile that gives the search engine more rev-
enue does not necessarily need to reflect better the relative
“ad-qualities” of advertisers or the actual click-through rate
after the ranking.
3. Changes in the ad-quality scores can result in the adver-
tisers’ bids moving from one NE to another. Any increase in
the search engine’s revenue comes from the decrease in the
advertisers’ total surpluses.
3. SCORING STRATEGY IN COMPLETE INFORMA-
TION SETTING
The nature of the ad-quality score and the dynamic interac-
tions between the search engine’s scoring and the advertisers
bidding make search engine revenue maximization far from
a straightforward business. Under the same scoring profile,
there might be multiple NE bidding sets and multiple result-
ing rankings. The existence of multiple equilibria also adds
to the difficulty in reasoning about the search engine rev-
enue generated by the ad auction, since it depends on which
equilibrium (potentially from among many) is selected by
the advertisers. In light of this, we choose to start our anal-
ysis with the socially optimal ranking, which is independent
with the search engine and advertisers’ behavior. Besides,
the maximum social surplus obtained under the socially op-
timal ranking serves naturally as an upper bound for the
search engine’s maximum achievable revenue.
Let us add fake slots with click-through rates x·,j = 0 for
j = S+1, ..., N to make the total number of slots match the
total number of advertisers. Let σ be a one-to-one permu-
tation function from the advertisers’ index set {1, ..., N} to
the slots index set {1, ..., N}, so that for advertiser i, σ (i)
gives its rank. Let Πi (σ) be the surplus for advertiser i
with respect to ranking σ and Πad (σ) =
∑N
i=1Πi (σ) be the
corresponding total surpluses for all advertisers. For any
permutation σ, the social surplus Πsocial (σ) is the sum of
total advertisers’ surpluses Πad (σ) and the search engine’s
surplus Πse (σ), where
Πsocial (σ) = Πad (σ) + Πse (σ)
=
N∑
i=1
(
vi − pi,σ(i)
)
xi,σ(i) +
N∑
i=1
pi,σ(i)xi,σ(i)
=
N∑
i=1
vixi,σ(i)
Definition 2. A socially optimal ranking σ∗ is the permu-
tation that maximize the social surplus, where
σ∗ = argmax
σ
Πsocial (σ) = argmax
σ
N∑
i=1
vixi,σ(i)
Table 3: Bids and quality scores for the key word “soda drink”, senario 2.
Advertiser ei bi ei × bi Rank pi,j vi xi,j (vi − pi,j)× xi,j pi,j × xi,j
Pepsi 50 $0.07 3.5 1 $0.05 $0.10 50 $2.5 $2.5
Coke 50 $0.05 2.5 2 $0.04 $0.10 50 $3.0 $2.0
Dr. Pepper 20 $0.10 2.0 3 $0.07 $0.10 20 $0.6 $1.4
Drink X 20 $0.07 1.4 4 $0 $0.07 0 $0 $0
Table 4: Bids and quality scores for the key word “soda drink”, senario 3.
Advertiser ei bi ei × bi Rank pi,j vi xi,j (vi − pi,j)× xi,j pi,j × xi,j
Pepsi 40 $0.08 3.2 1 $0.06125 $0.10 50 $1.875 $3.125
Coke 50 $0.05 2.5 2 $0.04 $0.10 50 $3.0 $2.0
Dr. Pepper 20 $0.10 2.0 3 $0.07 $0.10 20 $0.6 $1.4
Drink X 20 $0.07 1.4 4 $0 $0.07 0 $0 $0
Before we move on to analyze the scoring strategy for the
search engine, we assume the goal for any advertiser is sur-
plus maximization.
Definition 3. Given the values of the advertisers (v1, ..., vN ),
an equalizing scoring profile for the search engine is defined
as a scoring profile e∗ = (e∗1, ..., e
∗
N ) such that e
∗
i vi = e
∗
i′vi′
for all i 6= i′.
By definition, an equalizing scoring profile always exists, i.e.,
e∗i = 1/vi for all i. If e
∗ is an equalizing scoring profile, for
any k > 0, ke∗ is also an equalizing scoring profile. The
following Theorem 1 shows that where there are more ad-
vertisers than slots with N > S, under an equalizing scoring
profile, the set of truthful bids forms a Nash equilibrium.
Furthermore, in such an NE, the search engine extracts all
the surpluses from the bidders making the search engine’s
surplus equal the total social surplus.
Theorem 1. When there are more advertisers than slots,
N > S, under any equalizing scoring profile e∗, the set of
truthful bids b∗ = (v1, ..., vN ) is an NE. The surplus for each
advertiser Πi = 0 and the search engine’s surplus Πse =
Πsocial. The resulting ranking can be any permutation σ of
the advertisers.
Proof. Given the set of truthful bids b∗ = (v1, ..., vN ),
we have bi = vi and thus the price advertiser i paying is
pi = v1e1/ei = vi, for all i = 1, ..., N . Without loss of
generality, suppose advertiser 1 bids above its value v1. In
this case, it is assigned the top slot and the price for the top
slot changes to p1,1 = eivi/e1 = v1 which leads to no positive
surplus. Hence, this deviation is not strictly profitable. If
an advertiser bids below its value then it loses a slot if it had
been allocated one since N > S, or otherwise, it continues
to have no slot allocated. Again, no positive surplus. This
shows the set of bids b∗ = (v1, ..., vN ) is an NE.
Each advertiser’s surplus Πi (σ) =
(
vi − pi,σ(i)
)
xi,σ(i) = 0.
Since this is true for any permutation σ, any permutation
σ can be the resulting ranking from the set of truthful bids
b∗ = (v1, ..., vN ). 
In the proof of Theorem 1, it shows that under an equalizing
scoring profile e∗, the set of truthful bids forms an NE but
does not indicate whether this NE is unique. It is easy to
check that a set of bids where one advertiser bids above
its value while all other advertisers bids their values also
represents an NE and therefore, the truthful bidding set is
not the unique NE that an equalizing scoring profile e∗ will
induce.
In Theorem 2, we show that when N > S, under the equal-
izing scoring profile e∗ and the set of truthful bids b∗, among
the N ! possible NE permutations, the one that maximize the
search engine’s surplus is the socially optimal ranking σ∗.
Theorem 2. When N > S, under the equalizing scoring
profile e∗, the set of truthful bids b∗ and the socially opti-
mal ranking σ∗ = argmaxσ
∑N
i=1 vixi,σ(i) together form an
NE where each advertiser has 0 surplus and the search en-
gine has its maximum revenue equal to the maximum social
surplus Π∗se =
∑N
i=1 vixi,σ∗(i).
Proof. The results follow directly from Theorem 1. 
It is commonly assumed that the expected click-through rate
of advertiser i in slot j can be written as the product of an
ad-specific factor qi and a position-specific factor sj , specif-
ically xij = qisj . While this product form is not generally
true in practice, it makes the ad-specific factor and the po-
sition specific factor separable and usually leads to particu-
larly simple analytical results.
Assumption 1. The expected click-through rate advertiser
i gets in slot j can be expressed in a product form xij = qisj ,
where qi ≥ 0 is an ad-specific factor and sj ≥ 0 is a position-
specific factor. Furthermore, we assume the position-specific
factors are in a descending order with respect to the ranking
of the slots, that is sj > sj′ , for all j < j
′.
Theorem 3. Under Assumption 2, a permutation σ is the
socially optimal ranking iff for any adjacently ranked adver-
tisers (i, i′), where σ (i) = σ (i′)− 1, vixi,σ(i) + vi′xi′,σ(i′) ≥
vixi,σ(i′) + vi′xi,σ(i).
Proof. “ ⇒ ”. Obvious by the definition of social optimal-
ity.
“ ⇐ ”. Substituting σ (i′) = σ (i) + 1, xi,σ(i) = qisσ(i) and
xi′ ,σ(i′) = qi′sσ(i′) into vixi,σ(i) + vi′xi′,σ(i′) ≥ vixi,σ(i′) +
vi′xi,σ(i), we have
viqisσ(i) + vi′qisσ(i)+1 ≥ viqisσ(i)+1 + vi′ qi′sσ(i)
viqi
(
sσ(i) − sσ(i)+1
)
≥ vi′qi′
(
sσ(i) − sσ(i)+1
)
By the descending property of the position-specific factors,
we have sσ(i) − sσ(i)+1 > 0, which gives viqi ≥ vi′qi′ . Since
this is true for all adjacently ranked advertisers (i, i′), it
means the permutation σ is a ranking based on the descend-
ing order of viqi. Without loss of generality, we re-index the
advertisers such that for all i < i′, viqi ≥ vi′qi′ . Then
σ (i) = i, meaning advertiser i is assigned to slot i for all
i = 1, ..., N .
Now let us assume the socially optimal ranking is σ∗ 6= σ.
Then there is at lease one i, such that σ∗(i) 6= i. Let k =
min {i|σ∗(i) 6= i} and k′ be the index of the advertiser such
that σ∗ (k′) = k. Define another permutation σ′ that only
differs with σ∗ by swapping the ranks of advertisers k and
k′. Specifically, σ′ (k) = σ∗ (k′), σ′ (k′) = σ∗ (k) and σ′ (i) =
σ∗ (i), for all i 6= k, k′. The social surplus under the new
permutation σ′ is
Πsocial
(
σ′
)
= Πsocial (σ
∗)− vkxk,σ∗(k) − vk′xk′,σ∗(k′)
+vkxk,σ′(k) + vk′xk′,σ′(k′)
= Πsocial (σ
∗) + vkqk
(
sσ′(k) − sσ∗(k)
)
−vk′qk′
(
sσ∗(k′) − sσ′(k′)
)
= Πsocial (σ
∗) + (vkqk − vk′qk′)
(
sσ∗(k′) − sσ∗(k)
)
≥ Πsocial (σ
∗)
The last inequality follows the fact that k is the first adver-
tiser that does not satisfy σ∗(i) = i and therefore vkqk −
vk′qk′ ≥ 0 and sσ∗(k′) − sσ∗(k) > 0. Since σ
∗ is a socially
optimal ranking, σ′ is also a socially optimal ranking. By se-
quentially swapping all the out-of-place is, we will finally ob-
tain the permutation σ (i) = i and Πsocial (σ) ≥ Πsocial (σ
∗).
Therefore, σ (i) = i is the socially optimal permutation.

The proof of Theorem 3 shows a constructive way of find-
ing the socially optimal ranking under the equalizing scoring
profile by sequentially swapping neighboring ads seeking im-
provement of the total revenue until no improvement can be
made. The is an example where local search leads to global
optimum and the search algorithm costs no more than a
bubble sort!
Theorems 1-3 all together serve as the theoretical founda-
tion for constructing the adaptive online ad-auction scoring
algorithm shown in the next section.
4. AN ADAPTIVE ONLINE AD-AUCTION SCORING
ALGORITHM
In this section, we develop an adaptive online ad-auction
scoring algorithm to maximize the search engine’s revenue
in the incomplete information case where the values of the
advertisers are not known to the search engine.
4.1 Arguments on Advertisers Behavior
Before we move on to the algorithm construction, we make
two arguments of the advertiser behavior based on the sur-
plus maximization assumption for each advertiser
Argument 1. An advertiser will not bid above its true
value.
We have shown in the complete information setting, at least
with the equalizing scoring profile, one advertiser bids above
its value and other bids their values is an NE and therefore
overbidding is not an infeasible strategy. However, in prac-
tice, the search engine does not provide an advertiser with
its own or others “ad-quality” scores or others bids. While
over time, an advertiser is likely to learn all the informa-
tion to identify that itself is in an equilibrium, try bidding
over its value always has a chance of being penalized with
negative surplus.
Argument 2. If being left out without having a slot, an
advertiser will bid its true value.
By surplus maximization, the goal for any advertiser joining
the auction is to get a slot and maximize its surplus. Since
the bid is an advertiser’s only strategy to get itself a slot,
when keeps missing a slot, it will at least try to express its
maximum willingness to pay to see whether that can get it
a slot.
Though we are not proving the above two arguments, they
are not unreasonable in practice, especially when the scor-
ing mechanism is kept totally secret by the search engine.
In what follows, we propose an adaptive online ad auction
scoring algorithm for the search engine revenue maximiza-
tion taking advantage of the above two arguments. Though
the results we get may be too ideal in reality, it illustrates
a possible approach to reveal advertisers’ values and shows
insights into what will happen when the search engine have
a way to accurately estimate advertisers’ values.
4.2 Algorithm Construction
Theorems 1-3 show that in complete information setting,
how a search engine may maximize its revenue, 1) apply an
equalizing scoring profile; 2) induce truthful bidding; 3) find
the socially optimal ranking.
To apply the equalizing scoring strategy, the search engine
must have a mechanism to find out first the values of the ad-
vertisers. Once the values are found, an optimization proce-
dure is needed to search for the optimal ranking to maximize
the revenue. Accordingly, we have in our scoring algorithm
a “value revealing” module and an “optimal rank searching”
module to implement these two functionalities simultane-
ously. The idea is based on the following.
1. We divide the set of advertisers into two sets, one set U
contains all the advertisers whose values are not known yet,
the other set V = {1, ..., N} \U contains those whose values
are revealed already. By Argument 2, after the first NE is
reached, V 6= φ.
2. The value revealing module applies equalizing scoring
strategy to all the advertisers in V to make their ei×vi equal
(and therefore everyone is forced to bid their true value)
and then gradually increases eis (while making sure all ei×
vi increase the same amount) to push out surpluses from
the advertisers in set U . Since the ad-quality scores for
advertisers in U are not increased, an advertiser in U will
ultimately be forced to lose its slot and reveal its value to
the search engine. This is when the advertiser leaves the set
U and enters V .
3. Once a new advertiser i enters V , the optimal rank search-
ing module applies sequential swaps to the new member i
and its neighboring advertiser j by making a small ε > 0
difference between eibi and ejbj . The swap will keep go-
ing until no increase in the search engine’s revenue can be
obtained. By Theorem 3, when advertisers enter the set V
gradually, the optimal rank searching module makes sure all
the advertisers in the set V are ordered in a way that is
consistent with the social optimal ranking.
4. Any time an advertiser’s score is changed, the algorithm
will let all the advertisers settle into a new NE. By the way
how the value revealing module works, for any i ∈ V and
j ∈ U , we always have eivi < ejvj , and the auction rules will
make sure the permutation σ resulted from NE has σ (i) >
σ (j).
5. The algorithm continues until the set U is emptied. This
is when all the advertisers’ values are revealed and resulting
permutation σ¯ is the socially optimal ranking σ∗.
Figure 1 illustrates the flow chart with pseudo code for the
adaptive ad scoring algorithm. σ−1 is the inverse function
of σ so that given a slot index j , σ−1 (j) returns the index
of the advertisers occupying slot j.
ID is the index of the advertiser in the set V that has the
highest rank, where ID = argmini {σ (i) |i ∈ V }. Last is
the index of the slot that equals the total number of adver-
tisers in set U plus 1, where Last = |U |+1. NE (·) is a func-
tion that takes the input of a scoring profile e = (e1, ..., eN ),
simulates the Nash equilibrium of advertisers’ bids and then
returns a resulting permutation σ. t keeps track of the total
number of score adjustments needed for the algorithm.
Under Assumption 1 and by Theorems 1-3, the final ranking
σ¯ obtained by the proposed algorithm is the socially opti-
mal ranking σ∗. The total search engine revenue Πse →
Πsocial (σ
∗) as ε→ 0.
5. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: IMPLEMENTATION AND
RESULTS
We test the proposed algorithm under the 8-slot sponsored
ad setting used by Google, Microsoft (Bing.com) and Yahoo!
with 9 advertisers. Given 8 slots, 9 advertisers, there will
be 9! ≈ 360, 000 click-through rate distribution vectors. We
first show that our algorithm finds the social optimal ranking
when the system parameters v, q and s take static values.
We then show that in a dynamic environment, our algorithm
is able to adapt to the changes of these parameters in a
timely fashion.
Finally, we relax the assumption that the click-through rate
takes a product form of a ad-specific factor and a position-
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Figure 1: Flow chart for the adaptive scoring algo-
rithm
specific factor and make the click-through rate also depen-
dent on the relative positions among the advertisers. Under
this new model for click-through rate, our algorithm can
not claim optimality. However, we show by simulation that
the maximum revenue for the search engine obtained by our
algorithm is close to the optimal search engine revenue.
5.1 8-Slot Auction with Static System Parameters
We set the user value vector as v =(19, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 13, 12,
1), the position-specific factor vector as s =(65, 50, 40, 36,
30, 18, 12, 10, 0) and the ad-specific factor vector as q =(35,
45, 35, 20, 50, 20, 10, 70, 5). (we need these two vectors to
generate the actual click through rates x for different per-
mutations). The socially optimal ranking for this scenario is
σ∗ =(2, 3, 5, 7, 4, 8, 6, 1, 9) and the optimal social surplus
Πsocial(σ
∗) = 123, 180.
We set the initial scores for all the advertisers to be 100, i.e.,
e0 = (100, ..., 100). The algorithm runs 338 iterations (i.e.,
it adjusts the ad-quality scores 338 times) before it stops.
We show in Table. 4 the output of the algorithm, where b¯i,
e¯i, p¯i denote the final bidding, ad-quality score and price for
each advertiser i respectively.
We also obtain the final revenue for the search engine to be
Πse(σ¯) = 122, 032.85, which is 99.07% of the social optimal
Table 4: Output of the algorithm for static case.
Advertiser i rank σ¯(i) b¯i × e¯i b¯i p¯i
1 2 1909 19 18.94
2 3 1903 8 7.97
3 5 1893.7247 7 6.997
4 7 1892.5 6 5.992
5 4 1895 5 4.997
6 8 1890 4 3.987
7 6 1893.125 13 12.995
8 1 1915 12 11.962
9 9 1886 1 0
revenue Πsocial(σ
∗) = 123, 180.
Our first observation is that the output ranking σ¯ equals
the social optimal ranking σ∗. The second observation is
that the price p¯i each advertiser i pays almost equal to its
individual value vi, which means each advertiser has almost
no surplus left. Combining the previous two observations,
we conclude that the search engine gets almost all the sur-
plus. We see that this is indeed the case when we compare
Πsocial(σ
∗) and Πse(σ¯). The third observation is that ei×bi
is ranked the same as the advertiser ranking, with the ad-
vertiser who ranks higher gets larger ei × bi. This property
ensures that the rule of the ranking is observed, i.e., the
search engines should order the advertisers by bi × ei.
Fig.2 shows the evolution of the values eti × b
t
i for all ad-
vertisers and illustrates how our algorithm works. In this
example, advertiser 9 has both the lowest value and ad-
specific factor, therefore remains ranked last throughout the
process. Advertiser 6 has the next lowest value and is forced
by the value revealing module to bid its value at approxi-
mately t = 150. This is when the two trajectories et6×b
t
6 and
et9× b
t
9 meet and advertiser 6 enters the set V from then on.
Then advertiser 5, who has the third lowest value, is forced
to bid its value at approximately t = 175. This process goes
on until at time t = 334, when advertiser 1, who has the
highest value, is forced to bid its value. At this point, the
bti × e
t
i becomes almost equal for everyone.
We notice that advertisers join the set V in the order of
their values. However, the final rank σ¯ is in the order of
qi × vi by the work of the optimal rank searching module.
The small ε difference in ei×bi plays the role of maintaining
the relative positions of the advertisers in V according to the
social optimal ranking. Because of this ε difference in ei×bi,
the price each advertiser pays is slightly lower than its true
value and therefore making the search engine’s revenue a
little less than the total social surplus. This little gap can
be view as a cost to the search engine in order to keep the
advertisers ranked in the way it wants.
5.2 8-Slot Auction with Dynamic System Parameters
In this subsection, we show that once our algorithm has
found a socially optimum ranking, it is able to track small
changes in the individual value, the position-specific factor,
or the ad-specific factor in a timely fashion.
In order to do so, we assume that these parameters are time
varying, and we use vu, qu and su to denote the value of
these parameters at time instance u, respectively. We are
interested in the number of adjustments of the ad-quality
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Figure 2: Evolution of ei× bi produced by the algo-
rithm for all advertisers.
scores the search engine needs to perform before the old
optimum profile (optimal ranking and optimal scores) can
adapt to the new system parameters and arrives at a new
optimum profile.
Now, we generate the parameters at time u by vu = vˆ + ǫuv ,
qu = qˆ+ǫuq , s
u = sˆ+ǫus , where vˆ, qˆ and sˆ are the mean values
of the parameters; ǫuv , ǫ
u
q and ǫ
u
s are the noisy realization to
these parameters at time u; and vu, qu and su are the actual
values these parameters take at time u.
The simulation setting is as follows. In order to compare
the results obtained in the previous subsection, we choose
vˆ =(19, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 13, 12, 1), qˆ =(65, 50, 40, 36, 30,
18, 12, 10, 5), sˆ =(35, 45, 35, 20, 50, 20, 10, 70, 0), which
are the same as the corresponding static parameters in the
previous subsection. We set ǫq ∼ N (0, 36), ǫs ∼ N (0, 25)
and ǫv ∼ N (0, 0.1). This setting implies position-specific
factors are more volatile than the ad-specific factors and the
values of the advertisers are almost static.
We run the algorithm 11 times. The initial setting is v1 = vˆ,
q1 = qˆ, s1 = sˆ, with a randomized initial ranking and e0i =
100 for all advertisers. The values of v, q, s remain the same
until the algorithm finds the social optimum profile at time
u, then vu+1, qu+1 and su+1 are perturbed by ǫq, ǫs and ǫv.
The algorithm restarts by using the ranking and ad-quality
score profile obtained at time u, and adjusts the scores to
adapt to the new values of vu+1, qu+1 and su+1.
In Fig. 3, we show the evolution of resulting ranking pro-
duced by our algorithm1.
In Fig. 4, we show the number of adjustments of the ad-
quality scores needed for each time instance. We compare
two cases in this graph. Case 1: ǫq ∼ N (0, 36), ǫs ∼
N (0, 25), ǫv ∼ N (0, 0.1); Case 2: ǫq ∼ N (0, 100), let ǫs ∼
N (0, 64), ǫv ∼ N (0, 1). It is clear that the parameters of
Case 2 are much more volatile than those of case 1. We ob-
serve that more volatility in the system parameters results in
1We check that at each time instance, the ranking produced
by our the algorithm is the same as the social optimal rank-
ing.
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Figure 3: Evolution of σ¯u produced by the algo-
rithm for all advertisers.
more adjustments for the algorithm to find the optimal rank-
ing. However, in both cases, once the algorithm finds the
social optimal ranking in time instance 1, the adjustments
needed for the algorithm to adapt to the new parameters in
the subsequent time instances are small.
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Figure 4: The number of score adjustments needed for
each perturbation of the system parameters.
5.3 8-Slot Auction with Modified Click-Through Rate Model
We first describe a modified click-through rate model that
takes into consideration the effect relative position between
direct competitors on the click-through rates. We assume
that among the 9 advertisers, some of them are direct com-
petitors in selling the same type of product (we call them
“Group 1 Advertisers”), while the rest of them are not in
direct competition with any of the other advertisers (we call
them “Group 2 Advertisers”). An example for this situa-
tion in reality is that when we search ”EOS Camera” on
www.goole.com, 6 of the sponsored ads are related to the
web sites that sells new Canon EOS cameras; 1 of them sells
refurbished EOS cameras, and 1 of them sells magazines re-
late to Canon EOS cameras. We further assume that there
are a fixed number of people that will only click on Group
1 adds (we call them “Group 1 Users”), and they click on
each ad i in Group 1 with a probability proportional to qisi.
Assume there are a fixed number of people that might click
on any of the ads shown, with a probability proportional to
each ad’s qisi . Based on this click-through rate model, the
swap of the positions of any two advertisers will result in the
change of click-through rate of all other advertisers and our
algorithm can no longer guarantee a social optimal ranking
every time.
We set the number of Group 1 and Group 2 Advertisers to be
6 and 3, respectively; set the number of Group 1 and Group 2
Users to be 400 and 200, respectively. We ran the algorithm
on 100 auctions based on the modified click-through rate
model with randomly generated parameters (v, q, e). We
have obtained a 91.6% averaged ratio of Πse(σ¯) and Πse(σ
∗)
for all runs, with a standard deviation of 0.0549. Although
it is less than the averaged ratio we get from the product
click-through rate model (almost always larger than 99%),
it can be seen as a reasonably satisfactory result.
5.4 Efficiency of the Algorithm
The proof of Theorem 3 shows that the optimal rank search-
ing module in the proposed algorithm takes O
(
N2
)
total
number of ad-quality score adjustments before the algorithm
terminates. While the number of score adjustments in the
value revealing module depends on the initial scoring and
increment size of the score adjustment, it is polynomial in
terms of the input size viqi, for i = 1, ..., N . The biggest
uncertainty that affects the efficiency of the algorithm comes
from the function NE (·). In practice, in order for the rev-
enue to stabilize to determine whether a swap of the neigh-
boring advertisers is profitable, it is required that every time
after the scoring profile is adjusted, the advertisers form
a certain bidding equilibrium. We argue that over time,
the advertisers are likely to learn all relevant information
to make an equilibrium decision. Furthermore, this equilib-
rium does not necessarily need to be an NE and therefore
does not require each advertiser to have complete informa-
tion about others’ behavior. In our implementation with
complete information assumption, the algorithm finds the
NEs very quickly.
6. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS
1. The proposed algorithm does not involve any functional-
ity that can not be implemented by the search engines.
2. The proposed algorithm does not involve any estima-
tion of the click-through rates but is solely driven by the
total revenue generated which can be observed directly by
the search engine. In order for the revenue to stabilize, it
is required that every time after the scoring profile is ad-
justed the advertisers form a certain bidding equilibrium.
This equilibrium does not necessarily need to be an NE and
therefore does not require each advertiser to have complete
information about others’ behavior.
3. Both our theoretical and empirical analysis shows that
the search engine can extract almost all the surpluses from
the advertisers, given that there are more advertisers than
slots and the values of the advertisers can be accurately es-
timated. Though in reality some of the arguments and as-
sumptions in the model may not hold, our analysis demys-
tifies what a revenue-maximizing scoring strategy for the
search engine should look like. Specifically, it first needs to
get close to an equalizing scoring profile which solely de-
pends on the estimation of advertisers’ values. Then by
making infinitesimal differences between advertisers’ rank-
ing scores, the ranking should be made in the order of the
product of the ad-quality specific factor and the advertiser’s
value. This is fully consistent with what search engines in-
terpret the ad-quality score. For example, according Google
AdWords, the “Quality Score is based on: 1) The historical
CTR of the ad on this and similar sites; 2) The quality of
your landing page”.
4. The theoretical and empirical analysis shown in this pa-
per implies that in a monopoly market where advertisers
do not have a choice of other search engines, the monopoly
search engine can abuse its power by maximally extracting
the surpluses from the advertisers. There are concerns that
“... since the ad quality factor is under the search engine’s
control, it gives the search engine nearly unlimited power to
affect the actual ordering of the advertisers for a given set of
bids” [5]. However, to our knowledge, no previous literature
has studied theoretically and empirically how far this “un-
limited power” can go for a monopoly search engine. The
analysis in this paper may lead to new ways of identifying
the abusage of a search engine’s monopoly power in charg-
ing the advertisers. For example, we can check whether the
“ad-quality scores” do reflect the relative qualities in the ads
as they claimed to be or they are merely manipulating tools
used by the search engine to extract as much surpluses as
possible from the advertisers.
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